10 August 1981

Talking Points for Meeting with Secretary of Defense

- 1. In recent years the demands placed upon the Intelligence Community have necessitated that greater attention be focused on developments within the NATO military forces, particularly within the NATO air and air defense forces.
- 2. This requirement stems primarily from two sources. On the one hand, we need to better understand the Soviet perception of the threat confronting Moscow. The scope and direction of the Soviet defense effort over the next decade will depend to a great extent on their perception of NATO's strength. On the other hand, we continue to receive requests from both the NSC and Congress to provide more comprehensive comparisons of the balance of forces which exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Such comparisons normally include not only the current force postures, but anticipated developments stretching into the 1990s.
- 3. The strength and capabilities of NATO's air forces are particularly important for several reasons. The perception of qualitative superiority enjoyed by the NATO air forces has compelled the Soviets to field increasingly sophisticated—and expensive—aircraft of their own. New air-delivered weapons such as improved conventional munitions and cruise missiles promise to have a dramatic effect on the Warsaw Pact air defense system. Finally, the NATO air forces will play a very large role in the TNF discussions, and it is essential that we arrive at a common understanding of NATO capabilities and intentions as soon as possible.
- 4. In the past the Intelligence Community has devoted only a relatively small portion of its resources to NATO issues. Recent efforts to acquire information on NATO forces have met with only mixed results. On occasions, the sensitivity of NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons has led to animosity and accusations against the CIA that it is improperly extending its analysis into areas of "net assessment," a responsibility reserved to the Department of Defense.
- 5. In order to address these complex and difficult issues, we would like to request that the DoD undertake a comprehensive examination of the trends in the development of the NATO air forces. This examination would include presentation of detailed order-of-battle figures since 1960 and projected improvements through 1990. It should also include all USAF aircraft which have been earmarked for NATO deployment during this period. We believe such a study would provide a standard reference aid for addressing all future questions on this topic.

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